www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk, проверено 29.06.2019.
296
Krebs B. Did the Mirai Botnet Really Take Liberia Offline? // Krebs on Security, www.krebsonsecurity.com, 04.11.2016.
297
‘International Hacker-for-hire Jailed for Cyber Attacks on Liberian Telecommunications Provider’, National Crime Agency.
298
Ibid.
299
Mattijs Jonker, Alistair King, Johannes Krupp, Christian Rossow, Anna Sperotto and Alberto Dainotti, ‘Millions of Targets under Attack: A Macroscopic Characterization of the DOS Ecosystem’, Proceedings of IMC ’17, 01–03.11.2017.
300
Kaspersky E. «The Man Who Found Stuxnet – Sergey Ulasen in the Spotlight» Nota Bene, Notes, Comment and Buzz from Eugene Kaspersky // official blog, www.eugene.kaspersky.com, 02.11.2011.
301
Например, правительство США с 1992 года придерживается «презумпции отказа» на экспорт программного обеспечения в Иран (‘Iran Sanctions’, RS20871, Congressional Research Service, обновлено 04.02.2019).
302
См.: www.zerodium.com, проверено 29.06.2019.
303
‘Tor Browser Bounty’, www.zerodium.com, 13.09.2017.
304
См.: www.twitter.com/Zerodium, проверено 25.05.2019.
305
O’Murchu L. Stuxnet Using Three Additional Zero-day Vulnerabilities // Symantec Official Blog. www.symantec.com, 14.09.2010.
306
Kaspersky E. The Man Who Found Stuxnet.
307
‘Rootkit.TmpHider’, VirusBlokAda, www.anti-virus.by, 17.06.2010.
308
Ibid.
309
Пользователь frank_boldewin, www.wildersecurity.com, 14.07.2010.
310
Falliere N., O Murchu L., Chien E. W32. Stuxnet DossierVersion 1.4 // Symantec Security Response. February 2011. P. 2.
311
Langner R. To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve // Langner Group (November 2013).
312
‘Country Analysis Briefs – Iran’, U. S. Energy Information Administration (09.04.2018). Р. 1.
313
‘Country Analysis Briefs – Iran’, U. S. Energy Information Administration (16.04.2010). Р. 5.
314
«Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran – Report by the Director General» // International Atomic Energy Agency. 06.06.2003. P. 2.
315
‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran – Report by the Director General’ // International Atomic Energy Agency. 15.11.2004. P. 9. Инспекторы признали, что следы высокообогащенного урана могли появиться из-за загрязнения при импорте оборудования.
316
Linzer D. Iran Was Offered Nuclear Parts // Washington Post. 27.02.2005.
317
Falliere N., O Murchu L., Chien E. W32. Stuxnet DossierVersion 1.4. P. 5.
318
Zetter K. Countdown to Zero Day. New York, 2014. P. 222.
319
Stuxnet Patient Zero: First Victims of the Infamous Worm Revealed // Kaspersky Lab. www.kaspersky.com, 11.11.2014. Р.2.
320
BroadW. J. A Tantalizing Look at Iran’s Nuclear Program // New York Times. 29.04.2008.
321
Langner R. To Kill a Centrifuge. P.12.
322
Zetter K. Countdown to Zero Day. P. 3.
323
Langner R. To Kill a Centrifuge. P. 10.
324
Zetter K., Modderkolk H. Revealed: How a Secret Dutch Mole Aided the U. S. – Israeli Stuxnet Cyberattack on Iran // Yahoo! News, news.yahoo.com. 02.09.2019.
325
‘Stuxnet 0.5: How It Evolved’ // Symantec Security Response. 26.02.2013.
326
Zetter K. Countdown to Zero Day. P.333.
327
Ibid. P. 238.
328
Ibid. P. 359–62.
329
Langner R. To Kill a Centrifuge. P. 15.
330
Santos N. BlackEnergy APT Malware // RSA NetWitness Platform, www.community.rsa.com, 23.03.2016.
331
Hultquist J. Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks // FireEye Threat Research, www.fireeye.com, 07.01.2016.
332
‘General Assembly Adopts Resolution Urging Russian Federation to Withdraw Its Armed Forces from Crimea, Expressing Grave Concern about Rising Military Presence’, United Nations General Assembly Plenary Seventy-third Session, 56th Meeting (PM), 17.12.2018.
333
‘Cybercrime BlackEnergy2 / 3: The History of Attacks on Critical IT Infrastructure of Ukraine’, CyS Centrum, www.cys-centrum.com, 06.01.2016.
334
Styczynski J., Beach-Westmoreland N., Stables S. When the Lights Went Out: A Comprehensive Review of the 2015 Attacks on Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure // Booz Allen Hamilton. September 2016. P. 14.
335
Barak I., Rustici R. ICS Threat Broadens: Nation-State Hackers Are No Longer the Only Game in Town // Cybereason, www.cybereason.com, 07.08.2018.
336
Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid // Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Centre, www.eisac.com, 18.03.2016, p. 4.
337
Zetter K. Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid // Wired. 03.03.2016.
338
Styczynski J., Beach-Westmoreland N., Stables S. When the Lights Went Out. Р. 20–21.
339
Ibid. Р. 21.
340
Ibid. Р. 22.
341
Greenberg A. How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar // Wired. 20.06.2017.
342
Ibid.
343
‘Міністерство енергетики та вугільної промисловості України’ («Министерство энергетики и угольной промышленности Украины»), www.pe.kmu.gov.ua, 12.02.2016.
344
Santos N. BlackEnergy APT Malware.
345
Greenberg A.
